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The Thesis considers the question of reasons for a higher public appeal of national leaders 
with the case study of popular appeal of the President Vladimir Putin among the Russian 
population. The concepts of nation and national mentality are contemplated to reveal the 
process of construction of the image of a national leader. In the thesis the author considers 
the issues of nation and the process of its formation; constructivist and primordialistic 
approaches to the nature of nationalism and problems of national mentality; genesis of 
Russian nation and peculiarities of national mindset. Theoretical concepts are applied in 
the analysis of a TV-program with the participation of the President: Direct Line with 
Vladimir Putin. The author applies a method of interpretive content analysis, which lets 
answer the research question of how specific characteristics of national mentality are used 
for the purpose of creating a positive image of the head of state. The program is analysed 
from the emotional perspective and demonstrates how the basic traits of the Russian 
national mentality are operated within communication between the nation and the 
national leader. The analysis is divided into several subsections where different topics are 
discussed, while specific emotions and peculiarities in national mentality are appealed. 
As follows from the analysis, the influence and power over a nation is constructed through 
the intimate knowledge of the nation’s mentality specifics. The research comes the 
conclusion of inevitability to comprehend the nation, its history, culture, and system of 
values for a national leader for the construction of public approval and loyalty. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A well-known quote « toute nation a le gouvernement qu'elle mérite » (Latham 1906, 
181) belongs to Joseph de Maistre, a Sardinian ambassador to Russia in 1803-1817, who 
is considered to be one of the founders of the European conservatism. De Maistre was 
famous with his anti-democratic and pro-absolutist views, which probably was one of the 
reasons for his successful relations with the Emperor Alexander I. The diplomat-philos-
opher had lived at Russian court 14 years of his life, and apparently experienced the es-
sence of Russian cultural peculiarities, as this statement of a nation having the govern-
ment it deserves, occurs to be more than relevant to the following discourse in this Thesis.  
Russia’s vast territory, massive deposits of oil, gas, diamonds and other mineral re-
sources, its active participation in international affairs assured the country a profile of one 
of the richest and most powerful countries in the modern world. For many centuries, this 
country has been retaining the status of a great power, and the whole world takes into 
consideration Russia’s position on many issues of international politics and economics. 
Russia is an influential member of the Baltic sea region, which participates in numerous 
regional projects. However, a higher influence on the whole world’s decisions does not 
involve a greater level of the Russia’s population life: in the multiple international life 
quality indexes (as of March 21, 2020, Numbeo’s page listed). Russia holds rather low 
positions. One would expect that for the country where population stays unsatisfied with 
the work of its government, the most evident option would be to change this government. 
However, the President’s more than 20 years in power tell us another story: among Rus-
sians Vladimir Putin retains the status of the most popular politician. 
 
1.1. Research question, objectives, and methodological frame of the research 
The image of the president of Russia in the foreign mass media is drawn with a severe 
brush – a tyrannic governor, willing to rule the whole world. However, according to the 
data of Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), 66.1% of respondents ap-
prove of the President of the Russian Federation (as of March 6, 2019, VCIOM’s page 
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listed). Similar results can be seen in the surveys of the other independent, non-govern-
mental polling and sociological research organization Levada Centre: 64% as of February 
2019 (as of March 6, 2019, Levada Centre’s page listed). The public rating of Vladimir 
Putin almost never goes down in spite of unpopular activities of the government and 
higher level of corruption neighbouring the growing level of poverty of the country’s 
population. This state of things only brings me to one obvious question: why do Russian 
people keep on trusting and supporting their leader? To answer this question, I will also 
need to define the principal objectives of this research: first, to explain, how the public 
approval and loyalty are constructed; then, I need to define, what are the specific traits of 
the Russian national mentality; and finally, how these specific traits are used for the 
maintenance of positive image of the country’s leader. To achieve these objectives, a case 
study approach will be applied to analyse one of the major TV-programs with the partic-
ipation of Vladimir Putin, live broadcast nationwide phone-in, or a Direct Line with Vla-
dimir Putin. 
The work on this Thesis starts with the coverage of the previous studies and research to 
get clear understanding of the subject. First and foremost, I start with elucidating the con-
cept of nation, what can be qualified as a nation and what approaches to the concept exist 
in the present-day science. Then I elaborate the problem of national mindset and what this 
notion comprises, what influences the formation of the mentality of a nation. After this I 
continue with the Russia’s case and consider the process of development of Russian na-
tion, the first appearances of national feelings and circumstances of shaping these cate-
gories, as well as peculiarities of Russian national mindset. This being done I switch to 
the very research question – how these national peculiarities are used for sustaining a 
positive image of the Russian President and reproducing it within Russian media culture. 
This requires a short introduction on the circumstances of Vladimir Putin’s coming to 
power, which I provide as the beginning of the third section of the Thesis: it is important 
to understand what was the image of the current President since his very first months of 
rule yet in the position of the Prime Minister, and why he gained the popular appeal so 
extremely fast. After I present a general picture of Russia’s situation at the turn of century, 
I conduct an analysis of the tools which let Vladimir Putin retain his higher level of peo-
ple’s support, and a TV-program as one of the most spectacular evidence of theoretical 
conclusions made in the previous section of the Thesis. 
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The Thesis represents a qualitative research aimed at revealing the mechanisms of ma-
nipulation people’s rapport to the state’s first person through peculiarities of their national 
mindset. To reveal such tools and mechanisms it is necessary to focus on the process of 
communication and interaction between the head of the state, in this case, the President 
Vladimir Putin, and people living in the country.  
Working with regard to such an abstract issue as national mindset requires a deep research 
of the topic to create necessary context, or theoretical frame, for the designed analysis. 
To create the required theoretical frame I conduct a detailed overview of the previous 
research on the topic and analyse such concepts as nation and the process of its formation; 
types of nationalism and problems of national character; genesis of Russian nation and 
peculiarities of national mindset. I also provide a story and circumstances of Vladimir 
Putin’s accession to the power. 
Further, to answer my research question, for subsequent empirical research I focus on a 
TV-program, which is a specific form of television interview, where Russian President 
Vladimir Putin answers questions and appeals of Russian people addressing him through 
text-messages, video-letters, live broadcasts etc. The whole TV-program lasts over 4 
hours which would produce enormous scope of material for the designed analysis. The 
video recording belongs to public domain and is available at the website of Channel One 
(as of February 21, 2020, Channel One page listed), whereas its full transcription can be 
found at the website of Kremlin (as of February 23, 2020, Kremlin’s page listed). Being 
publicly accessible these materials do not require any permission to be used for the pur-
pose of analysis.  
The program contains elements of a television interview - a genre which is valuable with 
such an important quality as audience appeal and spectacularity. The audio-visual nature 
of television communication provides not only the speech with all the richness of its rhet-
oric, intonation, emotional colouring (like on the radio), but also mimics, gestures, the 
behaviour of the interlocutors, and often their environment (room interior, landscape sur-
rounding people, etc.) as the source of information for the designed analysis. However, 
richness of such content and its complexity require appropriate procedures for transcrip-
tion, description, and interpretation both in their discursive succession and in their pre-
sentative simultaneity (Raab & Tänzler 2012). Since video material represents a multidi-
mensional source of information, I shall analyse both audio-data, which is the transcribed 
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text of the program, and visual data, with the aim to evaluate and interpret images, effects 
and symbols of what is being broadcast to Russian people on an annual basis by the main 
federal channels. 
In my analysis I shall focus on connotative meanings, or latent content of the material. 
The material contained in the TV-program to be analysed is rather extensive, however, it 
seems to be impossible to divide the content into fragments, since it can result in the loss 
of context, which in important for interpretation of connotative meanings. This is why 
traditional coding rules are not applicable in my case; instead, to assure more holistic 
approach, I perform interpretive content analysis, which “has the flexibility to take con-
text more fully into account” (Ahuvia 2001). As connotative meanings represent individ-
ual elements intertwined to reveal the meaning of the whole, interpretive content analysis 
will be an effective method to answer the research question, how specific characteristics 
of national mentality are used for the purpose of creating a positive image of the head of 
state. 
 
1.2.  Literature and data used in the research 
It is reasonable to note here, that some of the sources used within this research were writ-
ten over 50 years ago, which does not diminish their importance for the research. Given 
the fact that the phenomenon of nationalism, as well as national consciousness and na-
tional character, are comparatively young, the scientific interest and research of these 
concepts was initiated in the middle of the 20th century. 
To answer the research question and to reach the objectives set out for the Thesis it is 
necessary to create a theoretical framework that will include concepts required for the 
subsequent analysis.  A research of the issues of mentality requires first and foremost 
representation of the term nation itself, and accordingly the work on the Thesis started 
with getting acquainted with the theory of imagined communities of Benedict Anderson 
(1983), whose work is considered to be a fundamental input into the theory of nations and 
nationalism. Anderson considers a nation and nationalism as phenomena of the New Age 
and the era of capitalism. The emergence of a nation recreates for the individual a mean-
ingful and understandable picture of the world, lost after the decline of the religious com-
ponent of the worldview in the era of the Reformation and Enlightenment. According to 
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Anderson, the phenomenon of nationalism redefines concepts power, time and society. 
Although Anderson’s theory demonstrates only modernists’ approach to the problem of 
nationalism, his work defines the basic notions and provides exhaustive illustrations of 
how present days’ nations had been forged and what were the possible incentives for their 
appearance. 
Another meaningful source that provided the basis for the theoretical framework of this 
Thesis is the book “Nationalism. Five roads to modernity” by Liah Greenfeld (1992). This 
source represents a comprehensive analysis of the development of the concept of nations 
and the formation of national identity in Russia, England, France, Germany and the USA. 
The author exhaustively considers the prerequisites, which led to the emergence of na-
tions and what kind of events influenced this process. In his fundamental work, the author 
deeply analyses these processes in the historical and culturological context, from the birth 
of nations till the present day. 
 “National consciousness in eighteenth-century Russia” by Hans Rogger became a sub-
stantial contribution to the work on the development of categories of national character 
and national consciousness in Russia, implying by the latter “…striving for common iden-
tity, character and culture by the articulate members of a given community” (Rogger 
1960). The book provides the circumstances of the process of crystallization of Russians 
as a nation and their realization of their being a unique, independent people. The book 
provides an insight into the conception of national feelings through analysis of the pro-
cess’ reflection in literature, historical events and social discourse. Nowadays its ideas 
seamlessly resonate with the many aspects of cultural and historical memory of Russian 
people with regard to the period of rule of Peter I and Catherine II, and their historical 
heritage. The author is very illustrative of how national consciousness was gaining its 
shape through comparing with foreigners after Peter had cut his window to Europe, 
through realising of being different and striving to prove their being not worse, but at 
least, equal to the progressive Europeans. The work of Hans Rogger provides a brilliant 
example of constructivist approach the concept of nationalism which I elucidate in the 
following chapter.  
The issues of nationalism and national character have also been addressed to in numerous 
academic articles, such as “Anthony D. Smith on nations and national identity: a critical 
assessment” by Montserrat Guibernau (2008); ““Russian Tsar” in the matrix structure of 
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Russian traditional consciousness (experience of philosophical reconstruction)”,  by An-
drey Myasnikov, 2012, “At the Origins of a Russian National Consciousness: Eighteenth 
Century Roots and Napoleonic Wars” Marc Raeff (1991); these articles also contributed 
a lot as a meaningful basis for theoretical frame of the research. 
Formulation of research question required verified statistical data, which were obtained 
from such research organization as VCIOM and Levada-Center. Both of them regularly 
conduct sociological polls that let construct a clear understanding of the current situation 
in the Russian realities. In the Theses there were used two sources of sociological data 
for the purposes of avoiding a biased presentation of the data, since of the two VCIOM is 
an official, state-owned organization, while Levada-Center is a non-governmental organ-
ization. Thus, the use of these two sources lets us get a balanced idea of an actual public 
opinion in Russia. The references to the data provided by these statistical agencies are 
grouped into the block of primary sources in the reference list. This block also includes 
the links to the website of First TV-Channel with the recorded video of the Direct Line 
with Vladimir Putin, as well as its full transcription provided by the website of the Krem-
lin. 
Finally, when discussing the level of public approval of Vladimir Putin, I refer to several 
both Russian and foreign newspapers’ publications, which illustrate how his activities are 
covered in mass media, promoting the positive image of the national leader.  
 
2. Nation and national mentality  
Nowadays the term nation is widely used in mass media: United Nations Organization, 
national interests, national heritage, national identity… Therefore, to initiate an investi-
gation into the issues of national character, national consciousness, and peculiarities of 
the Russian national mindset, the inevitable first step would be to operationalize the def-
inition of the term nation itself. What can be defined as a nation, what are its core char-
acteristics and what originates nations, gives birth to them and determines their destinies? 
It is a crucial point here since it is vital to understand the distinction between a nation and 
other sorts of communities, as well as the difference between a nation and an individual, 
although they share many common traits, as will be seen hereafter. 
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2.1. History of the term nation 
The concept of nations is being discussed for the last several centuries. One of the most 
remarkable first uses of the term can be exemplified by the name of Holy Roman Empire 
of the German Nation, which was introduced in the early 16th century to represent a su-
pranational unity of Italian, German, Balkan, Franc and Western Slavic states and peo-
ples. Thereafter, the term found its way into the works of diverse philosophers, writers 
and historians. It remains unsurprising then that research into the nature of nations has a 
long history. Moreover, the meaning and connotations of what constitutes a nation have 
been constantly changing. The semantical evolution of the notion of a nation has been 
graphically described by Liah Greenfeld in her book entitled “Nationalism. Five roads to 
modernity” (1992). By introducing the concept of “semantic change zigzag pattern” she 
traces the transformation of the term’s meaning and identifies several stages in the under-
standing of the idea of a nation. (Greenfeld 1992, 9).  
The term nation itself has origins in Latin (natio) where among ancient Romans it stood 
for a group of foreigners whose origins derived from the same place. Greenfeld in her 
work on nationalism finds that this connotation remains in force and spreads to Western 
Europe, where several centuries later it could mean a group of students who came to 
Parisian universities from all parts of Europe. Additionally, Greenfeld highlights here that 
the students’ national identity was simultaneously connected to their status as students 
and was lost upon termination of their studies (Greenfeld 1992, 4). Therefore, these stu-
dents themselves left an imprint on the term, which later acquired a new gradation: it was 
interpreted as a community unified by similar opinions.  
The next transformation related to the idea of a nation occurred when the previously men-
tioned community of similar opinions migrated from the universities and eventually ar-
rived in the form of religious elites, from whence the idea then spread to the political, 
cultural and social upper classes. In her analysis of a “zigzag” semantic transformation of 
the word “nation,” Liah Greenfeld explains the process and consistent pattern of such 
changes in the use of the same construct. Essentially, she believes that this process is 
continuously redirected via societal change, in which the evolution of social relationships 
makes possible the shift in the word’s connotation, giving room for a slightly new concept 
of a nation (Greenfeld 1992). 
The next stage in the development of the idea of nation can be traced back to the sixteenth 
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century when in England the term gained an implication of the whole population of the 
country. As Greenfeld (1992, 6) states, “this semantic transformation signalled the emer-
gence of the first nation in the world, in the sense in which the word is understood today, 
and launched the era of nationalism”1. However, this shift can hardly be called an evo-
lutional change, since it is undoubtedly a revolutional one: it meant that people’s (or 
plebs’) position, to some extent, became equal to that of an elite. Therefore, a person no 
longer needed to belong to a privileged class to be a part of a nation, as it used to be 
before. The members of this community realized their more equal status compared to the 
previous situation of the elites, and social classes and stratification gradually began to 
lose their former significance. Although, this levelling did not completely remove dis-
tinction, rather it laid the groundwork for the development of future democratic values, 
since the average person now felt involved in the honour of being a nation. What is more, 
people as a nation acquired the status of the bearer of sovereignty, which signified a trans-
formation of political consciousness as well as the birth of such a notion as the national 
identity – a feeling of belonging to a nation. Thus, national identity - an essential trait in 
the phenomenon of a nation in a sense we use it nowadays – gained the meaning of such 
belonging and being a part of this unity that formerly had been available only to the elites. 
This was not, however, the last episode in the evolution of  nation’s meaning, and after it 
gained the connotation related to “sovereign people” in England, it gradually began its 
migration abroad, spreading to Europe and further, where populations had their own dis-
tinguishing political, territorial and ethnic traits. This expansion resulted in a new trans-
formation related to the implication of a nation, which eventually acquired the meaning 
of a “unique sovereign people” (Greenfeld 1992, 8). This uniqueness, not only the role of 
a sovereign representative, but being particular and different from other countries’ popu-
lations, was the main distinction in the new way to approach the word “nation” that had 
been adopted from England. During the process of such adoption, the term again slightly 
changed and bore a new concept of the phenomenon. While the English population re-
mained as the first nation, it held to the constructed meaning of the term, which consisted 
of the sovereignty of the people. The notion borrowed from England by other peoples 
added an implication of uniqueness. Therefore, it seems reasonable that the same sense 
of English national identity cannot apply to the French, Russians, or Finns, as they real-
ized they were different, and this difference then provided the basis for the construction 
                     
1 Original text in italics 
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of a new type of nationalism. 
This revised way to understand the phenomenon of a nation has never replaced its prede-
cessor, and despite significant difference in their nature they both coexist in the modern 
world, being referred to as a nation, or nationalism. It is hard to argue with Greenfeld’s 
conclusion that these two different types of nationalism implied “… radically different 
forms of national identity and consciousness, and two radically different types of national 
collectivities – nations” (Greenfeld 1992, 9). This statement finds endorsement in multi-
ple studies introducing two schools that consider the phenomenon from the position of 
constructivism and primordialism, and this fact deserves a more detailed consideration, 
which will be further provided. 
 
2.2. Constructivism vs primordialism in defining the concept of nationalism 
These above considered developments of representation of nationalism can serve as a 
basis of what nowadays is referred to as primordialist and constructivist approaches to 
the problem of nation and nationalism. The terms, or even methods of categorisation of 
concepts can differ, as Liah Greenfeld, for example, in her work introduces the terms of 
civic-ethnic and individualistic-libertarian vs collectivistic-authoritarian types of nation-
alism. But first and foremost, at this stage of research the problem will be to focus on the 
key standpoints of the two approaches. 
The constructivist school is presented by a wide range of concepts, where the concept of 
imagined communities is one of the fundamentals of the approach. This concept was of-
fered by Benedict Anderson in his work “Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism” (1983). Whenever the research refers to the idea of 
nations, the views of Anderson can be considered as an essential stage in the development 
of representations on nationalism. 
Anderson begins his most famous work with claim of the absence of any sound definition 
of a nation and offers a concept of a nation as “…an imagined political community – and 
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson 1983, 6). One can see an 
unconventional term ‘imagined’ which implies the fact that although the members of this 
community do not know each other personally, they realize themselves being united by 
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the feeling of the national brotherhood, i.e. the community exists only in the imagination 
of its members. According to Anderson’s theory, the idea of a nation appeared to replace 
the dominating position of religion about two hundred years ago; the changing status of 
languages and rapidly growing print capitalism contributed to the transmission of the idea 
of a nation as something that is common for other people within limited borders. Ander-
son offers several ways of the nationalism gaining its position in the people’s perception 
of their place in the world, and thus compares the spread of nationalism in Americas, in 
Europe and Russian Empire and in the colonial Africa and Far East. For the purpose of 
this research in the next sections we will particularly emphasise the specifics of official 
nationalism and russification, where the latter is also applied by Anderson with regard to 
other countries than Russia basing on the common for many European dynasties ambi-
tions to retain the power by joining with the national ideas. 
As one can see from the above, constructivist approach considers nations to be artificial 
products of people’s imagination. The core of constructivism consists in the idea that it is 
nationalistic policies of the state elites that create nations by means of certain tools (sys-
tem of education and study programs, a network of mass communications, print capital-
ism, propaganda of some specific linguistic representations, use of emotional factors etc.) 
There exist no any original, inherent traces of a nation; it is constructed in the conscious-
ness of the people through manipulation of this consciousness. It is of utmost importance 
to note here, that constructivists’ views are often also referred to as modernists’ ones: 
according to the underlaying premises of this school it is common to think that nations 
were artificially constructed only in the period of modernity, when there appeared the 
need in such construct. 
In his “Imagined communities” Anderson poses a key question to which he endeavors to 
find an answer: why do people choose to die for these products of their imagination? 
(Anderson 1983, 7).  How do national feelings cause such an affection that people agree 
to sacrifice their lives? This question of the inner value for an individual reveals a range 
of perspectives for the study of relational fundamentals of our society, including such a 
comprehensive phenomenon as a nation. Being a constructivist, Anderson attributes the 
leading role in formation of nations to the political and intellectual elites and almost ig-
nores the significance of cultural aspects, and his reflections are constructed regardless of 
singularities of ethnical cultures as a complex of developed traditions and psychological 
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peculiarities of the people.  However, to answer the question, posed by Anderson in the 
beginning of his research, it is crucial to remember that without any connection with psy-
chology, ethics, traditions and customs and other constituents of the communities’ life it 
seems to be impossible to explore such a category as national emotions, which seems to 
be viable, since nation is not a mechanism acting according to a set algorithm, but a com-
munity of individuals with their feelings, memories and convictions. Such observations 
inevitably lead us to the other school that adheres to the views, opposite to the one of 
constructivist, and in the modern ethnological and anthropological science is called pri-
mordialist. Before proceeding with deliberation on the essence of primordialism, it will 
be reasonable to make one remark: although there exists a decided difference between the 
terms of “nation” and “ethnos”, where the former implies political connotation and can 
refer to multiple ethnicities, and the latter involves more cultural categories and more 
often means one particular ethnical group with its own unique culture, language and cus-
toms; according to the literature reviewed in this study, it is more common for construc-
tivist to exploit the term of nation, while in the primordialist discourse the notion of ethnos 
is met more frequently, while they mainly imply the same phenomenon under those terms. 
 Primordialism gained traction during so-called second wave of globalisation – the period 
when intensive invasion of western capitalism destabilised traditional societies and re-
sulted in multiple conflicts, whose structure and dynamics were impossible to investigate. 
According to modern ethnologist Sergey Kara-Murza, primordialism was born within the 
study of ethnic conflicts, whose emotional charge and irrational fury were not able to 
conceive any satisfactory explanation in European sociology and seemed to be something 
“natural”, prescribed by the genetic structure of those people (Kara-Murza 2015, 53). 
Within primordialist school one can identify two main perspectives, which are social-
biological and evolutional-historical ones. Social-biological concept considers ethnos as 
a community of individuals, which is based on biological principles, modified into social 
principles. Extreme cases of social-biological primordialist approach can easily turn to 
racist discourse, since its ideas are founded on the categories of blood and flesh, finding 
ethnicity to be a material substance, included into the structure of genetic apparatus of an 
individual.   Nowadays, this perspective significantly lost its ground and does not count 
any significant number of adherers.  
Evolutional-historical primordialism’ adherents regard ethnos rather as a community 
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where reciprocal affection does not represent a consequence of biological developments 
but is achieved and firmly enshrined through social conditions. Here ethnos is represented 
as a community of individuals who share the same name, same myths about their ances-
tors, with common history and culture, associated with specific territory, and possessing 
the sense of solidarity (Smith 1996). Sergey Kara-Murza supposes that the main idea in 
primordialism is that it gives ethnicity the meaning of ontological entity – a general im-
plication of being, numinous and beyond rational (Kara-Murza 2015, 59). He adheres to 
the opinion that most of the scientists accepting the primordialist approach, consider cul-
tural structures, imprinted during childhood, to be an inherent given. 
According to these principles, the belonging to one’s ethnicity is conceived as primordial, 
original fact of reality, which means that the everyday consciousness of people is imbued 
with the ideas of primordialism. What is of utmost importance here is that, according to 
previous studies, in conditions of crisis and social and state turmoil ethnicity becomes the 
most effective and fast-acting means of political mobilization. Appeals to the issues of 
common blood and solidarity of ancestry are easily perceived by the human conscious-
ness, manipulates the feelings and calls up collective memory. To site Montserrat Gui-
bernau: “Members of a nation tend to feel proud of their ancient roots and generally in-
terpret them as a sign of resilience, strength and even superiority when compared with 
other nations unable to display a rich past during which the nation became prominent” 
(Guibernau 2004, 137) 
Another meaningful postulate of primordialist approach consists in a fact that a people’s 
character – in this context, national character – always stays the same, and it can never be 
modified, and no new traits of this character can be artificially developed; this is why it 
is common to think that some peoples cannot hold rights (such as the right for democracy) 
which do not correspond with their natural constitution. Sergey Kara-Murza cites the 
words of Ivan Sikorskiy, who is considered to be the main theorist of Russian nationalism 
in his speech delivered in a ceremonial meeting of the Slavic charitable society on May 
14, 1895: “The traits of national character, its accomplishments and weaknesses are 
handed down to the following generations: in thousand years we meet in this race the 
same specifics of the national character”. (Sikorsky 1895, 5) 
One of the most comprehensive works on the issues of nationalism, and of the Russian 
nation in particular, belongs to Ksenia Kasyanova, who attributes a great importance to 
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the ethical aspects in the formation of the nation. Although her views are not distinctly 
primordialist, they are more prone to these narratives, and it would cause a considerable 
shortcoming not to include her perspective on the question of nature of a nation. 
According to Kasyanova, nation represents one of the stages in the development of a 
society, which initially forms a tribal community, and then transforms into an ethnos; the 
nation appears at the moment when the community is already significantly eroded in eth-
nical aspect – through mixed marriages and multiple long-term migrations - and the key 
ties are seen in culture, legends and traditions, as well as sustained hierarchy in the way 
of life. And then, at the critical moment of crisis and ruin, which inevitably comes at some 
point in the life of every society, where the state and social structure find themselves to 
be unable to survive the trial, it is the nation, that got mature enough to reveal itself, goes 
to the rescue and lets overcome the hard times. This is why not all the ethnos survive and 
stay in the past, only being mentioned as an episode of the country’s history. As alleged 
by Kasyanova, the nation arises in a specific situation i.e. particular conditions where an 
independent human personality is formed, and consequently for the genesis of this ethni-
cal entity the national identity is a prerequisite. (Kasyanova 1995). National identity, ex-
pressed in the sense of belonging to one nation, is thus a compulsory element for the 
ethnic entity to mature. 
In other words, on this stage a range of value structures appear in the community and 
occupy a niche where all of the community’s members unconsciously follow those values 
and share them. This system of ideals and aims, deeply connected with the ethnical com-
plex of values and representations is a stem that draws everything round it, and around 
which the nation gets crystallized. Ksenia Kasyanova compares these value structures 
with grammar in linguistics and states that it is the intellectuals who are to assume the 
responsibility in development of this “grammar of social behaviour”. Here we can follow 
how the idea of higher role of intellectuals closely echoes with the one of constructivist 
Anderson’s ideas with his intellectual elites, transmitting ideas of nation: a person could 
be considered as a member of intelligentsia, i.e. a person, responsible for the nation cul-
ture and the future of one’s society (Kasyanova 1995).  
 When the social entire goes beyond kin or local groups, then the blood ties, the ties in 
language and territory, which used to hold the ethnos and provide it with the common 
way of life, cease their connecting role, and then it is ideas and values, plans and projects 
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that are to come forward, a representation of a nation of itself and of the society – how it 
wants to see and create itself. Nothing will be developed and formed without these ele-
ments; otherwise everything will gradually fall and collapse, notwithstanding the outer 
formal ties of the state. 
As we can see, Ksenia Kasyanova holds to the perspective that a nation is not an artificial 
construct, created by an initiative of higher elites; neither she considers a nation to be a 
consequence of genetic and historical conditions, an implicit primordial entity. She as-
signs the key value in the genesis of a nation to the cultural elements and the maturation 
of the national identity. Not going to extremes of taking a nation’s existence for granted 
and seeing it as an artificially constructed entity, Kasyanova assumes the possibility of 
not-forming of a nation, if favourable conditions and its opportune time have not come. 
This perspective is the closest to the one that the author of this research tends to adhere: 
each of the schools and perspectives has in its disposal sufficient arguments, supported 
by reasonable examples of the present-days nations. The further detailed analysis of gen-
esis of the Russian nation will become an evidence of the fact that one cannot deny the 
significance of the role of governmental initiatives in the formation of a nation within an 
imperial state, while the cultural essential of such community defines what way the nation 
will follow, what choices it makes on this way and what hardships it will face. And if the 
influence of ruling institutions is more or less comprehensible, this forementioned essen-
tial cultural aspects require a more intensive study. 
 
2.3. Mentality and national character 
The work on the Thesis resulted in long-lasting pondering over the terminology to be 
employed in its text. The problems, which are to be discussed here, reveal lots of abstract 
notions, such as national identity, national consciousness, national character, national 
feelings and cultural memory. All these refer to a nation’s formation and its conscious 
and unconscious self-perception and require utmost accuracy when being used in the The-
sis. These inherent nuances caused significant difficulties and probably made this chapter, 
and the whole terminology aspect the most complicated for me.  
It would be appropriate to point out here, that, in spite of the fact that in the Russian 
discourse the term of national character is considered to be obsolete to some extent, I 
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initially held to the term “national character” to refer to the way a nation experiences its 
place in the world and the complex of values and its underlying philosophy, while the 
word mentalitet arose as a substitution. However, its translation into English offers the 
term “mentality”, which also implies the issues of mental development and mental stature, 
and thus distorts the main idea of this study. Oxford living dictionary provides this mean-
ing for the term “national character”: personality or cultural characteristics which are 
taken to be peculiar to or particularly characteristic of a certain nation or racial group (as 
of March 10, 2020, Oxford living dictionary page listed). At the same time, for “mental-
ity” there is the following meaning: the particular attitude or way of thinking of a person 
or group (as of March 10, 2020, Oxford Learner's Dictionary page listed). While working 
with the Thesis’ objectives, I shall concentrate on such categories as the nation’s system 
of values and its way of perceiving and interacting the existing reality, which means that 
the term “mentality” is more relevant within the context of this research. However, cul-
tural elements (for instance, cultural memory) are indispensable for the development of a 
nation; the cultural experience of the nation, which started accumulating during the cen-
turies of its existence, and even before it matured to be a nation, made this nation peculiar, 
and this is national peculiarities, that are to be addressed to while answering the research 
question. This brings me to a conclusion that the term “national character” also deserves 
to be carefully used in the discussion, however for the purpose of avoiding misunder-
standings and contradictions, the term “mentality” (or “mindset” as its rightful synonym) 
will be further used within this paper while addressing the research question and the ob-
jectives of the research. 
A list of literature used in this Thesis serves an evidence to the fact that research into the 
issues of national mentality has been provoking interest for the last several decades. Not 
only the idea of mentality turned out to be in high demand in the modern Russian realities, 
to some extent it became convenient to explain or excuse some current developments, 
thereby revealing both elucidating and ideological functions, such as an excuse of Rus-
sians’ inability to live according to western patterns (Yurevich 2013). The peculiar traits 
of national mindset are also important to consider, since implementation of reforms de-
veloped in pursuance of a borrowed model can produce an unexpected and unpredictable 
effect. 
As has been said before, research into the issues of mentality is inseparably followed by 
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specific difficulties: the concept lacks clarity and is often approached to as a vague and 
blurred notion; therefore any research about mentalities and national character always 
requires context, otherwise it risks resulting in conclusions that can be applied with regard 
to many nations, instead of revealing distinct characteristics. Furthermore, the study of 
national character implies the risk of devolving to national stereotypes, which undermines 
the idea of national character itself (Smith 2008, 477). 
Subjectivity is another danger in the study of mentalities. For example, Igor Kon quotes 
the reflections of Michel de Montaigne about the views on barbarian peoples of his time: 
‘I find that these peoples, based on what I was told about them, have nothing barbarian 
and savage, only if we do not name a barbarism something that we are not accustomed 
to. Since, frankly speaking, “we have no other standard of proper and reasonable than 
beliefs and customs of our own”’ (Kon 1971). Similarly, Robert J. Smith describes an-
thropologists’ research in the late 19th and early 20th century, in which the specificities of 
national mentality were studied in relation to the encrusted cultural terms and the apparent 
differences were found and explored “from their own cultural experiences” (Smith 2008, 
466). This inclination to consider and estimate the nature and traits of other cultures and 
other peoples through the prism of the cultural traditions and values of one’s own ethnic 
group in sociology and ethnology is referred to as ethnonationalism. 
A scientific study into the issues of mentality and national character can never be based 
on such assumptions; by contrast, one of its main tasks consists of critical analysis of 
everyday consciousness representations. And this study does not have its main purpose 
in identification or evaluation of separate cultural elements of characterological traits, 
rather it aims to analyse the symbolic meaning of mentality within particular social unity 
and reveal the circumstances of its construction and the grounds of its specific character-
istics. The research concerning national psychology is located at the confluence of several 
disciplines, and thus, the methods of such research stem from the traditions of different 
scientific schools: the ethnographic approach regards observation and description of dif-
ferent nations’ life and manners to be of paramount importance; the psychological ap-
proach aspires to analyse the mentality by means of diverse tests and interpretations of 
symbols, etc; the cultural-historical approach builds on analysis of cultural symbolism 
and popular art creations; and finally, comparative linguistics serves as a valuable source 
of the nation’s underlying psychological processes.  
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In the most comprehensive research about national mentalities, these approaches inter-
twine, communicate and complement one another. Investigating the mass of literature 
addressing the problems of a nation’s mentality peculiarities can be everlasting, however 
the scope of this research lies outside an exhaustive analysis of all the existing means to 
study this concept. What is more pertinent, in this research, is to grasp the significance of 
the term ‘mentality’ and the contents of the idea, as well as the factors fostering the de-
velopment of specific traits therein; moreover, the intent of this research is to contextual-
ize these specific traits in modern Russian realities and analyse their conscious use for the 
purposed of fostering the positive image of the national leader. 
For adherents of biological interpretation of national character, peculiar psychological 
traits of a nation represent something primordial, genetically determined and can be in-
herited by the following generations. These attempts to link the traits of national character 
to biological determinism surprisingly well resonate with biological primordialists’ view 
on the idea of a nation. However, my starting point coincides with the position of re-
searchers who claim that an individual is never born with a ready set of interests or a 
value system typical for his nation, but rather acquires them via education and socializa-
tion, is considered to be more solid and convincing for the author of this study. To quote 
Russian psychiatrist Andrey Kurpatov, “we are determined by the social environment 
where we grew up” (Kurpatov 2018). A child born of one ethos, brought up from the 
cradle in another social and cultural environment will hardly reveal the traits typical for 
his fellow countrymen, but inevitably will adopt peculiarities of people around him. Eth-
nocultural factor influences the peoples’ character regardless the colour of their skin, their 
height or eye shape. Many researchers agree that both intrapsychic predispositions and 
social experience as the product of socioeconomic environment are crucial, where the 
source of specific features of such an environment are provided with a historical basis 
(Smith 2008, 470). For example, Denis Podvoisky (2004) claims that national character 
is not a psychophysiological phenomenon: according to his ideas, specific empirical traits 
of character in specific nations mainly represent the product of social and cultural deter-
minism; moreover, he finds ethnopsychology to be determined par excellence by social 
and historical experiences of the ethnos, as well as by its extensive cultural memory. The 
phenomenon of cultural memory is one of the essential concepts in this Thesis, and it 
would be reasonable to introduce here the ideas of Jan Assmann, who found it to be a 
deliberate creation of a culture from which it arises, rather than a natural product. He 
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believes that “the contents of this memory, the ways in which they are organized, and the 
length of time they last are for the most part not a matter of internal storage or control but 
of the external conditions imposed by society and cultural contexts» (Assmann 2011, 5). 
A. Yurevich in his work on determinants and evolution of mentalities offers the following 
key influencing factors: ethnic qualities of the community, natural-geographic circum-
stances of its existence, and the products of interaction between the community and the 
outer social and cultural environment (Yurevich 2016, 106). First of all, population en-
dowment, temperament, whether the nation is monoethnic or polyethnic, – researcher in-
cludes all these factors into ethnic determinants of the mentality construction. On the 
other hand, he claims that it is climate conditions and the territory scale that determine 
the ways of adaptation and even key political institutions of the state. The third system of 
the national mindset construction drivers is the dependency on the products of centuries-
long interaction between the community and social and cultural conditions of its inhabit-
ancy: according to Yurevich, these factors influence the development of the fundamental 
social-economic ways and types of life-sustaining activity. 
This list of determinants is hard to disagree with, although their importance in the for-
mation of specific cultural traits will inevitably vary and alter. An endeavour to provide 
an insight into peculiarities of the genesis of Russian nation and specific traits of the Rus-
sian national mentality will be undertaken in to following section.  
 
2.4. Russia: nation and national mentality  
This section will inevitably bring us to a tour into specific periods of Russian history, 
since any present-days nation has its past. The nation’s history, as a constructed narrative, 
retains lots of answers to the questions arising nowadays, which makes it reasonable to 
start this section with the overview of circumstances and process that characterize the 
consolidation of Russian nation, which is then followed by an analysis of determinants of 
the Russian national mentality and its peculiar traits. 
 
2.4.1. History of Russian nation 
Most of the researchers agree that Russian nation together with national consciousness 
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began consolidating in the 18th century during the rule of Peter I and Catherine II, whom 
L. Greenfeld finds to be responsible for inculcating the idea of the nation in the Russian 
elite and stimulating the sense of national pride (Greenfield 1992, 191). However, it 
would be reasonable to presume that the first signs of national characteristics display can 
be traced back to the beginning of the 17th century: the Time of Troubles, the misfortunes 
and losses of the strife, “…made all the Russian in all the parts of Moscow state realize 
themselves to be not only Muscovites, or natives of Ryazan, or Yaroslavl or Tver, or 
Bryansk, but first of all - Russians” (Popov 2003). These can be interpreted as the first 
glimpses of national identity, and that time a ceaseless range of strives and troubles did 
not overpower a young nation, but brightened the society, brought it the idea of necessity 
to save the faith that was threatened by the external enemies, and the state, threatened by 
the inner enemies. By that time Russian ethnos had accumulated sufficient common ex-
perience, complex of assumptions and was ready for transformation towards a nation 
(Kasyanova 1995). 
However, it is in Peter’s rule the notions of “otechestvo” (fatherland), “gosudarstvo” 
(state) and “narod” (nation) were introduced in the vocabulary of his decrees and imposed 
upon the native Russians, who gradually adopted the new ideas. How intentionally did 
Peter initiate these innovative steps, was it in his design to organize people into a consol-
idated community, which could be more effectively ruled over – hard to say, since his 
reforms knew no limits, and what is more, as we know from the previous sections, the 
idea of such phenomenon as a nation was not that widespread in Europe and only was 
gaining its tractions. But, following Anderson’s theory, it was the ruler, who imposed the 
idea of nation from top to bottom, and obviously, this “bottom” was already mature 
enough to accept the offered idea.  
Further, as if in pursuance of Anderson’s ideas on the role of printed capitalism in the 
spread of nationalism, Peter established the first Russian newspaper “Vedomosti”, where 
there were once published his rather nationalistic views, justifying the war with Sweden: 
“… Not only Swedes, but also other and remote peoples, always felt jealousy and hatred 
towards the Russian people and attempted to keep the latter in the earlier ignorance…” 
(Greenfeld 1992, 197). Sergey Kara-Murza supports the idea, arguing that a politician 
that is forced to settle some burning issue, almost always speaks the primordial language, 
since this is the only way to find common ground with an ordinary person, who is a natural 
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primordialist, because he is familiar with the social reality in its finished ethnic form 
(Kara-Murza 2015, 61). This manoeuvre of national pride incitement will look very fa-
miliar to those who follow the present-day internal politics discourse in Russia. 
Catherine II, famous with her correspondence with Voltaire and being one of the most 
literate monarchs of her age, in her turn, enhanced the sense of national pride and con-
tributed to the consolidation of the Russia’s cultural elite. One should remember that, 
according to constructivist idea, it is cultural and intellectual elite who was responsible 
for the spread of nationalism in masses.  
Liah Greenfeld’s work contains an extensive analysis of Russian nobility situation in the 
18th century as the result of Peter’s and Catherine’s initiatives: a deep crisis of nobility’s 
identity caused by modifications in the ennobling procedure. The crisis had plenty of im-
plications, but at some point, it has morphed into a seed of nationalism: while being in 
limbo, without a solid status, it was the new idea of a nation that came to substitute the 
old-times’ state of mind, ruined by Petrine and Catherine’ reforms. According to Liah 
Greenfeld, "… Russian aristocrats … were beginning to experience therapeutic effects of 
national pride, and their identity as nobleman was giving way to the national identity of 
Russians” (Greenfeld 1992, 220). 
Peter and Catherine fostered Russia’s focus towards Europe, and their main interest was 
no more in Poland, rather it was in the Western Europe: France, England, and the Neth-
erlands. The nobility representatives were urged to travel abroad where they observed the 
respect towards the nobility and their sense of dignity; they also tasted there more crys-
tallized phenomenon of a nation (Greenfeld, 1992). As can be followed from the written 
above, from the very beginning, the basis of the national consciousness and national idea 
stemmed from the categories of national pride, opposition to the possible enemies and 
perception of the Russian people’s primordial uniqueness. These factors are important to 
bear in mind while discussing the crystallization of the Russian national character. 
Petrine and Catherine’s rule witnessed the proliferation of education: the first educational 
institutions, such as Naval Academy in St. Petersburg, Imperial Academy of Sciences and 
Moscow University were established in the 18th century. First noblemen who were sent 
to visit Europe, and then the graduates of these institutions “…were among the most ed-
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ucated men of their country at the time, and an important part of the emerging intelligent-
sia” (Greenfeld 1992, 237). As acknowledged my many scholars, it was intelligentsia 
who adopted the nationalistic ideas and developed it into a mature idea of the Russian 
nation. Intelligentsia was a new stratum in the Russian society, which needed an identity 
and satisfy their aspirations; the idea of the nation came to meet these demands and help 
intelligentsia representative to become patriots (Greenfeld 1992, 239). 
There are the signs of national consciousness in the 18th-century literature and science. 
Hans Rogger analyses the demand and interest towards the creation of a profound work 
on Russian history, since until the middle of the 18th century such attempts had been made 
only abroad and their results were considered to be slandering the glory and the honour 
of the Russian state. One could follow the struggle of the patriotic impulses of Mikhailo 
Lomonosov striving to confute the Norman theory and prove Riurik’s Slavonic origins2, 
and Gerhard Mueller’s honest and diligent attempts to prove Scandinavian parentage of 
the ancient Rus’. The fact that the events that had taken place nearly one thousand years 
ago resulted in an intense public controversy serves as “…a measure of the growth of a 
national consciousness in Russian society” (Rogger 1960, 202). Nikolai Karamzin creates 
the "History of the Russian State" - one of the first generalizing works on Russian history, 
discussing the origins of Russia as a nation.  
Eighteenth century became a transitional period where Russians first faced their being 
different from the West, tried to imitate and borrow to recompensate the gap between 
them, then turned around and focused at themselves to discover one being unique and 
independent people, different, but equal to those of Europe.  Russian national identity was 
fashioned in this striving to protect the good image of the country and the right to be 
different, to preserve traditions, at that not being beneath the West, who served as a touch-
stone. In the words of Hans Rogger, at that moment, “all the elements were at hand for 
the elaboration of a nationalist theory” (Rogger 1960, 137).  
If to follow constructivists’ dogmata, intelligentsia was further responsible for delivering 
the ideas of nationalism to the rest of the population. Aristocracy of education and intel-
lect, which had impressive extremal European influence, were the carriers of national 
                     
2 According to the Norman theory, Riurik was a Norseman, invited to be the Novgorod prince, and the 
ancestor of the princely, which later became the royal, dynasty of Riurikovich in Russia. Often regarded 
as the founder of the Old Russian state. 
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consciousness (Rogger 1960). Did it cope with the task? What was the destiny of the 
phenomenon, which had gained its shape and had been formed, ready to be accepted by 
the people? Or, is it possible to claim that the national idea has ever been formed at all? 
The answer to this question would be rather positive, due to the fact that Russian society 
can be considered consolidated as a nation, judging by the events of the Patriotic war of 
1812, when the nation marched off together, as an integral whole, to defend their patrie. 
Marc Raef in his work on origins of Russian consciousness (1991) articulates the terms 
of national pride and patriotic feelings during this period, highlighting, in particular, that 
the demonstration of common people’s and peasants’ national sentiments became a “dis-
covery” to the educated elites. The war witnessed an upsurge of national feelings and 
guerrilla movement, as a testimony of common people staying shoulder to shoulder with 
the nobles, and it was the desire to serve and to save their Fatherland against the outer 
threat.  
However, not everything went that smoothly with the process of the nations’ formation 
in Russia. We can see the evidences of constructivist processes in the elites and the role 
of the government (the Tsar) in the development of the national consciousness. The role 
of language and culture, and especially deliberate policies, that fostered the national feel-
ings during the 18th and further 19th centuries, can never be denied. But to grasp all the 
specifics of the process, it is essential to be aware of the realities of the Russian society 
in 18th-19th centuries.  
26 
 
As can be seen at the figure 1 
– which demonstrates only 
the European part of the 
country, since its parts east-
wards of the Ural mountains 
remained uninhabited till the 
beginning of the 20th century 
– overwhelming majority of 
the Russian population stayed 
illiterate, in spite of all the 
progressive 18-century rul-
ers’ endeavors. This fact 
brings us to the conclusion, 
that the idea of nation, suc-
cessfully formed within intel-
lectual elites of the Russian 
society, could not be effec-
tively delivered to the popu-
lation. About 80% of Russian 
people represented rural pop-
ulation (Rashin 1956, 85-
103), mainly peasants, who 
could barely read and most of 
them never attended schools. 
Education was no among pri-
orities in the inner politics of Tsarist Russia. Only in 1920s Bolshevist government made 
education compulsory and fostered proliferation of literacy among the population 
(Mironov 1991, 76). Therefore, until the end of the 19th century most of common Rus-
sians were not able to absorb the idea of a nation from newspapers, they knew no poems 
or odes, and no teacher was there to explain them their being part of a unity called Russian 
nation. It means that whatever polemics existed between Slavophiles and Westernists3, 
                     
3 Westernism and Slavophilism were the currents in Russian social and philosophic thinking of the 19th 
century, differentiating on the basis of origins and future destiny of the Russian nation: Westernists held 
Figure 1 Percentage of literate population of both genders (accord-
ing to population census of 1897) 
Encyclopaedic Dictionary (page listed) 
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its outcome would never reach the targeted audience, who did not ponder on common 
good or human rights, liberté and égalité, all they worried about was the stuff of life and 
the duties towards the landlord. 
But nevertheless, the nation has matured, as the troubles to come had not ruined it, but 
only reinforced. The success of the maturation can be presumed in the primordial predis-
position of people, hammered with the social and historical processes, fortified by the 
Eastern Christianity and cultural traditions and customs. The Russian national conscious-
ness of common people developed in parallel with the spread of ideas of Fatherland and 
patriotism among the noble stratum. This split between the social top and bottom serves 
as characteristic peculiarity of the Russian society nowadays. 
As the circumstances of the Russian nation’s formation have been examined above, and 
the overall pattern of what are its basics and pillars, it reveals us an opportunity to proceed 
with the deliberation on what Russian national mentality consists of and why it acquired 
its colours and shades.  
 
2.4.2. Peculiarities and determinants of Russian mentality 
The search for national character in Russia was initiated slightly after the national feelings 
had been conceived. Russian national myth has birth to common traits that can be at-
tributed to the Russian people, creating the following image, in the words of Hans Rogger 
(1960, 269):  
 
… a nation which was simple and unspoiled, straight-forwards and honest, loyal and 
God-fearing.  It may have been a bit coarse, this people, but the absence of polish and 
elegance was possibly an added guarantee of genuine sensibility and generous soul. 
 
The given rather flattering description is only one example out of many existing, and 
                     
to the Norman theory and offered to follow the European model in the upcoming reforms, while Slavo-
philes claimed the originality of the Russian nation and its having its own, specific way to be followed. 
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within this research the main question involves more profound peculiar traits of the na-
tion, the determining principles that guide the Russian people throughout its history. The 
range and significance of determinants in the development of the Russian mentality is 
rather vast, which makes it challenging to proceed to their analysis. Among the key de-
terminants of the Russian national character one could mention East Christian, or Ortho-
dox, church, geographical situation, and historical experiences of the country and its peo-
ple; these are the factors of key significance in the origins of peculiarities that will further 
be discussed. 
I will start with a factor, the influence and the presence of which can hardly be questioned, 
since it existed long before the first Slavonic tribes appeared in the East European Plain: 
geographical situation. Here one would include both location and climate conditions. 
Their role in crystallization of national character is not as apparent as particular historical 
events or the choice of confession and can easily be ignored when approaching one or 
another nation’s peculiarities. However, following the given analogy with an individual’s 
character, the physical conditions of life indirectly predispose the future views and atti-
tude to rigours of life; similarly, the natural situation of Slavonic tribes’ and the Russian 
people’s existence set a direction towards their present-day image. The very first Russian 
historiographers and philosophers found natural factor to be an important determinant; 
they described and assessed its value differently. N.A. Berdyaev assumes that geographic 
position of ancient Russian state predisposed formation of a country with an extensive 
territory, therewith that territory was easy to conquer, but extremely hard to organize and 
sustain the order in it. The philosopher believes that “…the size of the country set exor-
bitant task and took most of the people’s energy, keeping it in eternal stress” (Berdyaev 
2008). Berdyaev found eternal field and snows dominating over the Russian soul, sup-
pressing initiatives and giving birth to laziness and underdeveloped sense of responsibil-
ity. V. Kliuchevskii assigned the tendency towards melancholy and contemplativeness to 
the picturesqueness of the Russian landscapes (Kliuchevskii 1956). It may be added, that 
changing and unpredictable character of the climate over the Russian territory contributed 
to the resilience and adaptivity: it is more common for Russians to make a tentative plan, 
which later gets adjusted to outer circumstances and is finally almost never followed. The 
presumable deadlines in the projects are seldom observed, and the work is usually done 
with “an arrhythmic diligence – rush changes of working energy and idleness” (Dumnova 
2013). 
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These traits can be found in representations of Russian people to a certain extent; how-
ever, there exists one more peculiarity in the way of Russians’ perceiving the world, 
which is predetermined with the country’s location. Russia is situated between Europe 
and Asia, forming the border between West and East; an introduction to the lecture in 
Russia’s geography would have started with the statement, that Russia is European by its 
population, and it is Asian in its territory. This being “in between” resulted in what could 
be characterized as a pendulum development of the country and its people, swinging from 
West to East and back. Russian history witnessed several such reversal in the develop-
ment pendulum, and thus we come to the following determinant of the national character 
– the nation’s and the state’s history. Historical experiences of a nation inarguably repre-
sent a meaningful constituent in the construction of its self-perception, since, according 
to the Professor of Politics at Queen Mary University of London Montserrat Guibernau, 
history “…represents the cradle where national character was forged”: 
The selective use of history provides nationals with a collective memory filled 
with transcendental moments in the life of the community, events and experiences 
that allow people to increase their self-esteem by feeling part of a community 
which proved capable of great things and that might also be ready to become again 
a beacon to the world (Guibernau 2004, 137) 
 
In Russia tradition to use the country’s history dates to the Petrine rule: in the Tsar’s 
project history would evolve the concepts of citizenship, civic pride and responsibility; 
moreover, Peter use history as a justification for military policies. Such a pragmatic ap-
proach resulted in a governmental demand for creating official Russian historical narra-
tive in the middle of the 18th century, which coincided with the growing national con-
sciousness and resulted in impressive historical research and the start of Russian histori-
ography (Rogger, 1960). For the last three centuries history in Russia serves as one of 
main propaganda channels. It is not mere coincidence that the old school course books 
have been replaced, specifically, at the beginning of Vladimir Putin’ first presidential 
term in early 2000s, and then in 2016, soon after the events in Crimea. 
Since the limits and the objectives of this study do not allow us to make a detailed tour 
into Russian history, we will further consider several events in the country’s destiny, 
which very possibly, affected the outcomes of the nation’ mentality. 
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It is hard to deny that the period of the Mongol-Tatar Yoke (1243-1480) played a crucial 
role in the history of Russian state. The period of Russia’s being under the rule of the 
Tatars resulted in a 200-years stagnation. While other European countries were moving 
on, passing through the consecutive stages in their historical development, making mis-
takes and learning from them, and thus doing more and more steps forward, Russia stayed 
on its knees, trying to survive the dominance of the Asians. It is not a surprise then, that 
after having spent several centuries under the Yoke, then consolidating into the Muscovite 
state for several other centuries more, when Peter cut his window from Russia to Europe, 
which was about to become a Europe of the Enlightenment, imbued with the ideas of John 
Locke and Charles de Montesquieu, Russia got blinded with its backwardness and under-
development.  
With these prominent social and economic consequence of the Yoke, it is not surprising 
that, being under an Asian dominance, Ancient Rus’ gained so much from its occupant. 
Boris Akunin states an idea of the Hord’s being the second of two parents of the modern 
Russian state, where the first one was Ancient Rus’, whose existence stopped with the 
invasion of the Tatars (Akunin 2017, 386). He believes that the key “Asian” heritage for 
Russia can be witnessed in sacralisation of state power as a guarantor of stability and, as 
a result, limitation of personal liberties. In the Russian narrative the enlightened idea of 
social contract is inconceivable, since the state never serves its people, vice versa – people 
are in service of their state – this is the principle, which lied in the grounds of the Russian 
internal policies (Akunin 2017, 386). We remember the deliberations of Liah Greenfeld 
on the Russian aristocracy unstable and insecure situation whose position was not far 
from the one of slaves: their manors were granted at the ruler’s will for only temporary 
possession, as well as their favourable position could be undermined at any time. 
During this period Asian values of community, at the expense of personal interests, got 
inherent in the Russian mindset. European égalité and the rule of law, equal for everyone, 
is foreign to the Russians, for whom integrity of hierarchy, where higher position means 
a larger range of rights, is of greater importance, and all this comes from the years that 
Rus’ spent under the dominance of the Mongol-Tatar Yoke. Opinion of the family and 
society will always prevail over individual’s views, and any expression of initiative will 
face condemnation; a saying “no initiative ever goes unpunished” is so common in Rus-
sian folklore for a good reason. 
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Probably, this shift from West (according to B. Akunin (2017, 345)a pre-Mongol Rus’ 
belonged to Europe) towards East was the first significant swing of the Russian historical 
pendulum. Russia will keep on turning from Europe to Asia, and liberalization will be 
replaced with cracking down, reforms – with counter-reforms. The next remarkable shift 
happens with Peter I, who imposed European values and reforms to his uncivilized coun-
try; however the way he did it was undoubtedly Asian – Peter was cruel, no lesser Impaler 
than Ivan the Terrible, and obviously for him his choice of the end covered choice of the 
means: Russia became an acknowledged participant of European politics.  
During 18th and 19th centuries Moscow and St.-Petersburg witness the proliferation of 
European culture; French, English and German are compulsory to be spoken by aristoc-
racy representatives, and the Enlightenment postulates are widely discussed in the intel-
lectual society. But, as we see from the Figure 1, most part of the territory and population 
of Russia stayed illiterate, and thus Europeanisation reached the two capital cities and 
some regional centres, whereas the rest of people survived with Eastern values and views 
on the world. Again, we can observe the split: while the cities tried to turn, with an alter-
nate success, to the West, the rest of the country lived in the East. Russian history will 
face many other alterations of Western and Eastern orientation, but what is most im-
portant here, that this inconsistency and the lack of certainty about what tomorrow brings, 
bore a sense of anxiety, which is one of the key characteristics of the Russian mentality 
(Dumnova 2013). 
Liah Greenfeld in her work places an emphasis on ressentiment towards Europe - and 
later, the United States. She argues that this “…existential envy of the West – and the 
values which were to constitute the Russian national consciousness and later to be em-
bodied in the Russian national character were a result of the transvaluation born out of 
this ressentiment” (Greenfeld 1992, 250). Hans Rogger also provides an extensive narra-
tive of 18the-centiry-Russians’ being “always painfully aware of the fact that the Russian 
present was not nearly as enlightened as that of the West (Rogger 1960, 187). Until the 
20th century European countries were the Western adversary for Russia, while during the 
20th century this role is assumed by the United States. Ivan Kurilla in his lecture on Rus-
sian-American relationships states that to explain its contents and nature a state uses its 
opposition to another nation, and very often this constituting “Other” is a neighbour (as 
of October 7, 2019, Arzamas academy page listed). 
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Another influential landmark in Russian history and in the formation of the future Russian 
national character is the choice of Eastern Christianity in 988 by Vladimir the Great. Re-
ligion is apparently one of the most unquestionable and simultaneously complicated fac-
tors in crystallisation of the traits of national psychology. It is interesting that the choice 
in favour of Eastern Orthodoxy was also conditioned by geographical and geopolitical 
situation of Ancient Rus’, whose ruler intended to build up strong cooperation with Byz-
antine Empire (Tsurikov 2013). This amalgamation of constituent factors is one more 
evidence of complexity and versatility of the crystallization of mentality. Without going 
into a detailed analysis of principal ideas of Eastern Orthodoxy, we will concentrate on 
the main consequences of the Christianisation in 988, which can be identified in today’s 
Russian population’ character. A noteworthy detail is that although the present-day Rus-
sian nation can be not as religious as the one of 17th-18th centuries, and even if the church 
dogmas do not represent a strict code of behaviour for the modern young people, a one-
thousand-years-old history of Orthodoxy in Russia left an indelible imprint on the way 
the nation perceives itself in the world: the qualities, determined at some point by the 
Orthodox religious devoutness, constitute the basis of the Russian mentality within the 
context of irreligious society. (Dumnova 2013, 85). 
Most authors (Sorokina, Berdyaev) agree that Eastern Christianity invested Russians with 
a specific certainty about their messianism, being a chosen nation. This tendency is not a 
new one, many nations used to conceive of themselves as of the chosen ones, however 
for Russians the fall of Byzantine Empire and inheritance of leadership in the Eastern 
Christian world, followed by the release of the Mongols resulted in a persistent idea of 
Moscow’s being the third Rome. This is where enormous ambitions and imperial manners 
of Russia’s rulers stem from, and this is how its people find it reasonable that Russia is 
charged with responsibility for sustaining the world’s order. This messiah’s frame of 
mind of Russians led to a conviction of their being a priori aware of how others should 
live, and even more – striving to help other people, even without concerning of whether 
“others” need this help (Tsurikov 2013, 419). This belief gave birth to a peculiar Russian 
patriotism, and the narrative of Russia’s special path and destiny has been regularly em-
ployed by the government, seeking for support and approval of intervention as the basis 
for its foreign policies. Such an appeal to the national feelings reminds us of primordial-
istic ideas in definition of the basis of a nation. 
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N. A. Berdyaev in his works pays particular attention to the role of Eastern Christianity 
in the formation of future Russian mentality. He notes, in particular, that the key require-
ment and virtue of the Orthodoxy is represented by humility, which is seen nowadays in 
the absence of social responsibility and lack of initiative; the state of inner slavery is 
immanent in a Russian’s perception of himself. The basis of an orthodox universe is in 
solidarity and fraternal affection, and never it involves efforts to defend one’s rights or a 
self-sufficient personality, while demonstration of initiatives and independency have al-
ways been considered to be something immoral. (Lyuks 2018). I would conclude here that 
religious postulates, fostered by hierarchical relations imposed during the period of Mon-
gol-Tatar Yoke, resulted in the image of humble, faceless personality of individual of no 
value, so different from rational and strong-willed image in the West. It thus will be rea-
sonable to define the choice of religion to be one of principal factor in the construction of 
the narrative of individual as a mechanical tool serving its sovereign.  
As a matter of interest, Christianisation deepened the dualism of Russian mentality. Or-
thodox Christianity, borrowed from culturally developed Byzantine with long history, 
inherited from Antique Rome and Greece, was imposed on a one-hundred-years-old state 
with florescent heathen customs, although fast-developing and growing. As the result, 
Christianisation of Ancient Rus’ did not mean the adoption of byzantine culture and law, 
and everyday traditions intertwined with the newly borrowed Christian values. 
One can follow the image of Russian mentality getting more and more distinct; neverthe-
less, to achieve a more comprehensive representation, it is necessary to study one more 
aspect – specific attitude to the ruler. Through centuries Russia’s Head of State had been 
represented by Tsar, General Secretary of the Party and President, however, individual – 
power relations model stays unchanged till nowadays. 
It is crucial to bear in mind that the idea of autocracy was borrowed in the end of 15th 
century from Byzantine Empire with the purpose of creation of a unified centralized Mos-
cow state with an absolute power of the Grand Prince. Andrey Miasnikov in his analysis 
of the image of “Russian Tsar” (2012) describes the position of Tsar4 in the top-down 
governance between the God-Father and the birth father together with motherland, and 
therefore Tsar (who embodies all the possible forms of the Head of the State) holds a 
                     
4 Ivan IV became the first Russian Tsar, and thus the title of the Grand Prince of Moscow was replaced 
by the Tsar of the whole Russia 
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special place and his functions represent a crucial structural element in the Russian men-
tality (Miasnikov 2012).  
The long absence of a mass written culture and the lack of reliable source of political 
information resulted in a rather positive image of the Tsar in the national consciousness 
with prevailing symbolic and sacral characteristics. The folklore formed an image of an 
ideal ruler sent by the God, and in the c17th century in the national consciousness appeared 
a vision of Tsar-batiushka5, which became afterwards a meaningful ideologeme of the 
Russian autocratic rule (Miasnikov 2012). Tsar-batiushka symbolises the closeness of the 
higher ruler towards its people, who is hoping to be cherished, as the birthfather cherishes 
his own children, as well as belief in his endless compassion. Robert K. Massie, who 
dedicated his life to the research of the Romanov’s history, supports this image of Tsar-
batiushka: “The landowners, the police, the province governors and state officials were 
whole-heartedly execrated by Russian peasants. The Tsar – never. The Tsar, being closer 
to the heaven than to Earth, could never be wrong: he was batiushka, the father of the 
people. He did not know about the difficulties his children were suffering from”6 (Massie 
1971, 22). V. M. Pivoev in his article «“Ours” against “strangers”» supports the psycho-
logical connection with the archetype of the Father: “The image… was born in mytho-
logical consciousness as the ideal concept of a man who can protect “ours” against 
“strangers” ( Pivoev 1999). For such a hero his duties are considered to be sacred and 
thus he is entitled to use any means to reach his noble goals. If one considers the extreme 
natural-geographic and geopolitical situation of the Russian state, such position of the 
Tsar-hero can be also explained by a historical necessity, since the ruler’s undivided au-
thority was necessary for the survival of the Russian people, and the State. 
 
Upon an exhaustive and multilateral analysis of the factors that played instrumental role 
in the development of the Russian national mentality, as well as the process and circum-
stances of the forming of the Russian nation itself, we can grasp the essential traits of 
what lies in the fundamentals of Russian people’s attitude towards the rest of the world 
as well as the perception of their own place in it. Long before it got matured into a nation 
in every sense of the word, it had had to learn the laws of vertical of power where the 
                     
5 “Batiushka” is a softer form for “father” 
6 Translation from French by the thesis author 
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lower an individual is, the less rights he exercises, and the top position means respect and 
power. The authority of the community, senior members of the society, church, govern-
ment dominate over the individual’s views and mind, and religious postulates, that trans-
formed with ages into social norms, call for staying humble and submissive. Humility is 
perceived as a reasonable price for a privilege to belong in a state and to be proud of its 
glorious history and enjoy its rich cultural heritage. A person who leads the country 
through its life full of challenges and threats, deserves all the trust and magnanimously 
executes his overwhelming duties, representing the whole nation (his children) with dig-
nity in front of the whole hostile world. This nation blindly loves its motherland, being 
proud of what She (as Russia is a Mother – matushka) had to endure, its cultural and 
historic memory, and these primordial feelings constitute the core of Russian people’s 
mentality. I will further endeavour to analyse how these peculiarities, underlying the Rus-
sian national mindset, are operated to serve the maintaining of the positive image of the 
Russian President for almost twenty years. 
 
3. Construction of the image of Russian president through the specifics of national 
mentality: Direct Line with Vladimir Putin case study 
 
3.1. The image of Vladimir Putin in Russian society (Hero) 
After the dissolution of the USSR Russia stepped into the neoliberal reforms era that 
promised activation of the stagnant economy and a powerful impetus to social and eco-
nomic development of the young country. The new government was determined to build 
a country, which would not have any connection with its ancestor – the Soviet Union. 
Such a radical disposition of the government distilled into a range of thoroughgoing ini-
tiatives and reforms, which only deepened the crisis and resulted in serious complications 
in political, economic and social spheres. The claimed objectives by no means correlated 
with the results of economic and social policies. Irrationality of political realities in Russia 
of 1990-s had as the consequence an estrangement between the people and the govern-
mental institutions. The notion of national interest ceased to exist at all, and international 
image of the country was far from favourable as  new government took all possible meas-
ure to destroy any positive image of the country’s Soviet past, including its hard experi-
ences of the Great Patriotic war and lessons of the October Revolution. The country felt 
split to “us” and “them”, where “them” were those holding the power, who were showing 
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less and less interest in the destiny and concerns of “us”.  
The split between the poorer and the richer sectors of the population has multiplied, at 
that for the poorer majority liberal reforms turned out to be an abrupt decline in living 
standards, social status, restriction of subsistence needs and impairment of interests. 
(Zdravomyslov 2000, 25). The first part of the 1990s was especially marked with extremal 
inflation growth, when the prices rose 26 times in 1992 and again 10 times in 1993, while 
the salaries were growing almost twice slower, and were paid more and more often under 
the table. In 1997 many-months-delays in salary payment concerned around one half of 
the Russia’s population. (Gordon, Klopov 2000, 28). In 1999 there was a series of explo-
sions in Moscow and other Russian cities as a reaction to the counter-terrorist operation 
in Dagestan, where hundreds of people died. 
In these circumstances Vladimir Putin was appointed to the post of Prime Minister in 
August 1999. He was unknown, young official who started acting off the reel: plenty of 
effective and working measures were taken; one of the most remembered moments of 
1999 is Putin’s phrase: “We’ll beat them up in toilets”, which he used when announcing 
the decisive character of counterterrorist actions in the North Caucasus. This phrase, 
which sounds quite slangy even outside Kremlin, dropped during one of his speeches, can 
be interpreted as the first demonstration of the new politician’s unusual style of commu-
nication with his audience: he sounded frank, open and full of  determination to clear out 
the past decade’s Augean stables. At the same time Vladimir Putin looked humble, slen-
der and sportive which very beneficially contrasted with well-nourished image of a typi-
cal State Duma member, seen on TV-screens every day. Boris Yeltsin in his televised 
address as of August 9, 1999 named Vladimir Putin to be a person who was able to con-
solidate the society (as of October 21, 2019, Kommersant Newspaper page listed). It is 
hard to argue that Russia was then in desperate need of a figure who would assume the 
role of a hero to prevent the young country from an inevitable wrack, approached by 
failure reforms and any absence of social cohesion, so necessary in growing economies. 
Vladimir Putin became this hero at the end of 1999. It is pointed out, that within the period 
from October to December the share of people experiencing fear and despair lessened 
more than three times, while the share of people with emotional uplift, has increased 
(Zdravomyslov 2000, 32-33). According to the historian A. Barsenkov, Putin acted as a 
person who managed to unify Russians morally and psychologically, and people start 
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associating the young Prime Minister with the restitution of stability, order and gradual 
raise in living standards (Barsenkov, Vdovin 2010, 743 – 744). No wonder thus, that in 
March of the year 2000, Vladimir Putin got his victory after the first round of the President 
elections. Putin became that very Tsar-hero, who came to protect “us” against terrorists’ 
attacks, to restore Russia’s international image and to let “us” feel proud of being Rus-
sians again. There is no doubt, that one of his most meaningful achievements consists in 
bringing Russian economy into order within the first years of his presidency. Drawing 
conclusions to the economic results of Putin’s presidency in 2000-2008, The Wall Street 
Journal wrote in 2008: “The economy has not only recovered all the ground it lost in the 
1990s, but has also developed a robust service sector that was practically non-existent in 
the Soviet period. Russia has accumulated the third largest monetary reserves in the world 
after China and Japan” (Graham 2008). 
Nowadays Putin’s the most passionate proponents in Russia are represented by those who 
still remember the hardest period of 90s: they had to provide their families without any 
perspectives of further improvements or stabilisation of situation in the country; they lost 
any credibility in their government. These people these days are 45-60 years old, and they 
constitute the majority of those who come to vote during the President’s elections (as of 
November 29, 2019, Ria-Novosti page listed). For these people Vladimir Putin is the one 
who saved the country from a disaster and passed the whole way from the edge of a 
catastrophe to a stable country, maybe not always prosperous, but still livable. They feel 
grateful and this is the basis of their many-years-long allegiance. Many of them rear their 
children through transmitting them the same ideas, thus bringing up a new generation of 
Putin’s followers. 
According to some recent studies, the higher level of public approval is necessary or the 
regime stability; moreover, “…such popularity may legitimize the regime in the eyes of 
voters” (Frye et al. 2017). To achieve the required level of public support Vladimir Putin 
retains the image of a trustworthy, reliable politician, by keeping communicating with his 
people, commenting on the most burning social-political issues. Among other cases, there 
is a very illustrative one, when in summer 2018 a new pension reform was implemented, 
it caused a massive discontent and gave birth to an extremely negative public discussion. 
In two months, the President addressed to the people with a speech where he articulated 
the reasons and peculiarities of the reforms, having highlighted its advantages and insisted 
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on its inevitable character, as well as introduced the softer regime of the reform’s imple-
mentation (as of March 3, 2020, Kommersant Newspaper page listed; March 3, 2020, 
Kremlin’s page with the address video listed). The softening was presented as the Presi-
dent’s initiative, and even though the speech did not settle the problem of the public per-
turbation, it is very symbolic, how the head of state, batiushka, assumed the role of “a 
good cop”. 
Just as Josef Stalin in Jeffrey Brooks’ “Thank you, comrade Stalin!: Soviet public culture 
from revolution to Cold War”, Putin “…did everything, knew everything and took credit 
for everything good” (Brooks 2001, 65) in the Russians’ life. The news reported of Putin’s 
visits to orphanages, showed him inaugurating the hospitals, presenting the newest ideas 
and reforms. Moreover, the President starts to address now and then the issues of national 
glory and pride: celebration of Victory Day gains momentum, which is one more evidence 
of how appeals to the issues of common blood and solidarity give way to the manipulation 
of the people’s feelings. More and more Vladimir Putin gains the image of the one who 
returned national self-respect to Russians.  
The fact that Vladimir Putin skilfully manipulates peculiarities of Russian national men-
tality can also be evidenced with rally around the flag. Figure 2 demonstrates the Presi-
dent’s approval rating and one can clearly see how it reaches its maximum in September 
2008 (88 %), then June 2014 (88%), and June 2015 (89%). All these indicators coincide 
Figure 2: Putin’s approval rating 1999-2019 https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/ 
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with such meaningful events as Military conflict in Abkhazia and war with Georgia, an-
nexation of Crimea, and activation of the Islamic State with further Russian troops sent 
to Syria. Being actively exploited by mass media through invoking primordial national 
feelings of the people, these events are articulated with the final aim to consolidate the 
President’s image of the Hero whose main duty is to protect “ours” against “strangers”. 
Daniel Treisman, among others, in his research also came to a conclusion, that “…Rus-
sians have rallied behind the Kremlin at certain moments when Putin has struck patriotic 
themes” (Treisman 2014).  
For better understanding of the nation’s attitude to their President, it is crucial to grasp to 
nature of the relationship between the two. During his presidency, Vladimir Putin has 
made an impressive way from an administrator to a charismatic leader. Following the 
previously given ideas, in the President – Country – Nation triangle one can identify dis-
tinctly the family relationships matrix: Father – Mother – Children. Many Russian people 
perceive their President as their father, that is, as any parent-child relationships, their at-
titude towards him is emotionally coloured to a greater degree. According to Sara Ahmed, 
“emotions are performative, and they involve speech acts, which depend on past histories, 
at the same time as they generate effects” (Ahmed 2014). This is why emotions can be-
come as a useful tool in analysing the peculiarities of communication between the nation 
and the President. Apparently, through appealing to such emotions as love, hate, fear, 
pain, etc. the President presses the paint points, which enables the redirection of the sen-
timents of masses. 
Among the most effective and large-scaled tools in communicating with Russian people 
for Vladimir Putin is an annual live broadcast nationwide phone-in, literally – a direct 
line with Vladimir Putin. This kind of TV-program represents particular interest for this 
research, as it provides an extensive material for analysis of the image of the President 
within the matrix of the Russian national mentality and the further chapter will contain a 
detailed qualitative analysis of the video of the Direct Line with Vladimir Putin as of the 
year 2019.  
3.2. Analysis of the Direct Line 
According to Vladimir Putin himself, the Direct Line is the most powerful sociological 
survey that allows citizens to convey their position and assessment to the country's lead-
ership (as of November 29, 2019, Kommersant Newspaper page listed). The program 
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takes place annually, where Vladimir Putin answers the question that Russian citizens ask 
by phone and by means of live television connection from the largest cities of the country, 
as well as through email and text messages. His answers are broadcast live by the leading 
federal TV-channels and radio stations. The first program took place in 2001 and was 
organised every year, except for the years 2004 and 2012; in 2008-2011 the Direct Line 
also continued existing during Putin’s term as a Prime Minister. During the last years the 
live broadcast lasted around 4 hours, while the President answered 60-80 questions from 
an audience. These questions mainly concern actual events, current issues in economic 
and social spheres of the country, and the Direct Line takes on a form of a dialogue of 
Russian citizens with the key figure in their country. 
In 2019 the Direct Line took place on the 20th of June. According to Kremlin, there had 
been received more than 1,5 million of requests and questions from all over the country, 
of which almost 400 thousand by means of SMS and MMS, while a telephone call stays 
the most popular way to address the President. It was also highlighted that the requests 
kept on being processed even after the broadcast finished. Over 5 million people watched 
the program in 2019. The further analysis will be divided into blocks in accordance with 
the themes, relevant to the subject of this research. 
 
Visual content of the program  
The program takes place in the studio with invited guests, among which one could see 
sportspeople, people of arts, actors and successful entrepreneurs. Vladimir Putin takes a 
seat at a horseshoe-shaped table, where two main anchormen join him; however, they stay 
far enough for cameras to concentrate the principal focus on the President, which enforces 
the effect of his having an exam in front of the whole nation. Behind the President there 
is a large bright-blue screen, which creates an impressive ground-colour for Vladimir 
Putin, delivering his comments on the most provocative questions. At the moment of a 
close-up shooting this blue background gives Vladimir Putin’s eyes a bluish colour, en-
hancing the feeling of sincere and whole-hearted conversation. 
When answering the questions, Vladimir Putin demonstrates his expert knowledge on 
every question, by providing figures, dates and names a lot to the point, which boosts the 
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trustworthiness and reliability of the President’s words. As the program unfolds, he con-
stantly makes notes and asks to repeat in case if he misses some words; sometimes he 
frowns, or nods, and obviously, nothing of what has been discussed in the studio, will 
stay ignored by the President. The Head of the state provides all his answers and com-
ments in firm and steady voice, which at times gives him an image of a kind teacher who 
gives a lecture to his students. In fact, Putin indeed lectures Russian people on the issues 
of inflation and national projects, as if explaining far too complicated issues to those, who 
stay unsatisfied only due to their poor literacy. 
 
Relations with people: a loving father 
The first observation that can be made while watching the Direct Line – Vladimir Putin 
seems to be always aware of the problems, addressed to him by his audience: he says now 
and then that “this problem really exists”, and unfortunately it is not a new one. But what 
is more, every second case is replied with his agreeing on the gravity of the issue: he 
understands. As if enforcing the image of a fair-minded and caring ruler, the President 
takes the side of petitioners and thoroughly demonstrates his involvement into their prob-
lems and readiness to tackle them. Sara Ahmed suggests that a group (in this context – 
the nation) stays consolidated through the transference of love to the leader, and such 
transference becomes the ‘common quality’ of the group; in her words, “it is ‘love’, rather 
than history, culture or ethnicity that binds the multicultural nation together” (Ahmed 
2014, 135).  As has been said before, the relations between the nation and the head of the 
state, have the nature of family ties, where the President is seen to be a father to his chil-
dren – the Russians. Therefore, emotions of love are the mainstream in the context of 
relationships between Vladimir Putin and the Russian people. It is known that no love 
can be endless, as it always needs to be returned. The President-father promises to settle 
the problems, he acts as a guarantor of future happiness, “‘happiness’ that is always de-
ferred as the promise of reward…” (Ahmed 2014, 196). These promises nourish the peo-
ple’s affection, giving the hope for better future. 
 
Relations with the Government: effective and severe manager  
Just as Joseph Stalin back in 30s, Putin is rather authoritative, issuing orders, thus making 
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people personally responsible to him (Brooks 2001). Now and then he addresses directly 
to the high officials – ministers, governors – who have to report on the current situation 
and assume responsibility for further resolution of the problem. The President gives or-
ders and directives during the TV program and these seem to be more effective and work-
ing than official orders, signed in his cabinet beyond streaming. This invests the Direct 
Line with even more popularity and boosts the image of the program, as well as its main 
character. Furthermore, while commenting on the discussed issues, Vladimir Putin high-
lights several times that the responsible officials, who had failed to perform their duties, 
were dully punished: “By the way, the generals were dismissed”; or, the penalty is inev-
itable: “…there will be conducted necessary investigative measures for detecting all liable 
persons…”. During the latter minutes of the program there’s a demonstration of a frag-
ment of conference that starts straight after Vladimir Putin demanded from the regional 
governor to solve the problem discussed during the Direct Line; the work was in full 
swing and all this is due to, as the anchorwoman put it, “the magic effect of the Direct 
Line”. 
On the whole, throughout the Program the President now and then highlights his partici-
pation in the settlement of the problems discussed in the studio: I’ll have a talk to the 
Minister, I am taking it under my personal control, I’ll also keep an eye on it, etc. When 
in the very beginning of the program the Minister of Health is given the floor, Putin makes 
an impressive statement: “I also want to be heard… because one thing is when the Min-
ister speaks, and when I speak – is another”. Hard to imagine, what more could he say to 
boost his own significance. 
Although the President makes a statement of common responsibility for the situation in 
the country, nevertheless, he actively practices back passing, blaming other governmental 
structures, so to say, plays good cop-bad cop. When discussion refers the question about 
banks’ refusing  to lower mortgage interest rate to 6%, the President’ reaction is: “This is 
a real mistake of the Government and relevant institutions” (Government is a bad cop 
here); then follows such remark: “I had a talk to people in the Government… the problem 
has been solved” (while the President is evidently a good cop). 
This episode confirms the theory of contrasting the Tsar-batiushka to the landowners, as 
the one who is always there to protect his people against the malicious master. If to look 
at these episodes from the perspective of emotions, the idea of  Sara Ahmed of contrapo-
sition of love and hate can be a good explanation: the people’s hatred as a reaction to 
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injustice is redirected towards the Government officials, while enforcing the love senti-
ments for the one, who provides the lacking justice: this is an obvious “differentiation 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’, whereby ‘they’ are constituted as the cause of ‘our’ feeling of 
hate” (Ahmed 2014, 48). 
 
Reminder on the crisis of the 90s: the Saviour 
Not only the emotions of hate and love are powerful tools in influencing the people’s 
sentiments, but also the emotions of fear and pain. As has been noticed above, the expe-
riences of the transitional 90s with the profound crisis hold a significant share in the Rus-
sians’ collective memory. Fear of desperation and pain of the years of losses and need are 
still alive in the minds of millions. It is noteworthy, how throughout the program Putin 
several times reminds the audience of the desperate situation in the country 20 years ago, 
when he first appeared on the political scene. 
First, when answering the provocative question on the intentions of the ruling party, Putin 
says, that in the 90s “social sphere, industrial sector, the sector of defence was ruined, we 
practically destroyed our military establishment, brought the country to the Civil war and 
bloodshed in Caucasus, and led our country to the brink of sovereignty deprivation”. Fur-
ther, when comes the question of impossibility of any economic breakthrough whilst the 
decisions in the country are made by the economists of 90s, Putin again goes back to the 
country’s poor state, highlighting that nowadays “we have nothing common with the 
90s”, there is no that inflation rate, there is no that indebtedness and dependency on IMF, 
instead – our gold and currency reserves are growing. 
Later, there comes a storyline of events in Dagestan in August 1999 with a live broadcast 
from Botlikh, which is a rural locality and the administrative centre of Botlikhsky District 
of the Republic of Dagestan - is a federal subject of Russia, located in the North Caucasus 
region. A short report tells us how twenty years ago this place used to be a real battlefield, 
and everything here reminds of war. The story is delivered very picturesquely with the 
description of scenes of bloodshed and bombing. The participants of those events address 
Vladimir Putin with the message: “Dear Vladimir Vladimirovich… We remember the 
day when you came here, to Botlikh, at the most desperate moment…” The President 
replies further: “…As for those events, I shall remember them till the end of my life”.  
In the words of Sara Ahmed, “…it is fear of anarchy that makes subjects consent to being 
governed” She continues: “…Subjects consent to being governed: they give up freedom 
in order to be free from fear.” (Ahmed 2014, 71). Apparently, by evoking the events of 
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crisis Vladimir Putin appeals to the feeling of gratitude for the rescue of the country out 
of the 90s nightmare. These manipulations, evidently, are intended to foster the image of 
the one who knows where to go and how to act, increasing his significance for further 
peaceful life of the Russians. These constant reversions to the desperate conditions of life 
in the country twenty years ago say to the audience: if it weren’t Vladimir Putin, those 
would have lasted till nowadays; if we had another ruler, who knows, what the life would 
have been today; you must remember and you are to be grateful. As has been already 
mentioned above, in conditions of crisis and social and state turmoil the nation becomes 
an effective means of political mobilization. It is hard to argue here, that by appealing to 
the issues of solidarity Putin manipulates the national feelings and intends to refer to col-
lective memory of his audience. According Sara Ahmed, people’s priorities are being 
shaped through teaching them what life would be like without sovereignty: they “… must 
be grateful for being saved or being brought into civil society” (Ahmed 2014, 193). 
 
Demonstrative participation of blogosphere 
This year the Direct Line is peculiar with active participation of Internet bloggers as the 
evidence of interest and interaction between the state authorities and popular representa-
tives of social media. The anchorwoman highlights the activeness of blogosphere and 
every time announces the number of followers for those bloggers, which is, no doubt, 
impressive: 10 million followers, 7 million followers. The bloggers refer to burning is-
sues, such as the problem of waste disposal and introduction of sovereign Russian Inter-
net. However, upon a closer examine of these blogs, it turns out that that the questions, 
which they deliver to the President, could hardly sincerely belong to them: a quick look 
at their profiles will reveal total absence of any involvement into social-political live of 
the country. These performances are obviously designed as fragments of the program 
script, and this is supposed to endue the program with more trustworthiness. 
 
 Question about fresh water: you are our last hope 
There was a very expressive example of Putin’s communication with his people in the 
story with the absence of fresh water in Tyumen region. The people’s appeal took place 
in the form of video streaming from their place of residence where they complained about 
the poor quality of water in their town. Their voices are full of sincere despair and even 
there is a phrase: “Vladimir Vladimirovich, we have a big favor to ask…you are our last 
hope!” The President looks abashed, saying that the total absence of fresh water is a very 
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unusual situation. But then he drops the following phrase: “On the whole, of course, the 
problem exists all over the country; unfortunately, millions of people do not have access 
to drinking water, millions.” The phrase, used as an introduction to a long and detailed 
discussion of the problem with subsequent public reproof of the regional governor, in fact 
involves a significant underneath meaning. In the context of Russian national mindset, 
hearing that you are not alone who suffers from such situation can be interpreted as fol-
lows: I am only one, insignificant, element in this complicated system; there are millions 
of others who need help, my problem is not the most urgent; we maybe could be patient 
for a while. The phrase, in this context, is aimed at the communalism of Russian national 
state of mind: individual’s (in this case, residents of this particular town) needs are far 
less important than the common ones. The governor further gives promises to regulate 
the situation, and when he refers to the necessary procedural actions, such as application 
and demands, the President claims, especially stressing the “I”: “I have demanded for 
them. I ask you: do it as soon as possible. Did we agree?” Again, as many times before 
during the Direct Line, Putin demonstrated his personal involvement in the problems of 
his people, which contributes to his positive image around the country. 
 
President who feels ashamed 
In conclusion, the President gets asked: “Do you ever feel ashamed”. To answer the ques-
tion, Vladimir Putin says that, as any normal person, he happens to experience the feeling 
of shame; further, he tells a story, where he lost a piece of paper with an appeal of a 
woman, which he once met. “I will never forget it. I still feel ashamed of it”. When the 
president tells the story, silence reigned supreme in the studio, the stress is growing. His 
face is taken in close up, and we see him being very sad, while his voice is trembling. The 
whole picture is saying: I am a normal person, same as you all, not immune to human 
sentiments. This scene is a final chord in boosting the personal image of the President 
Vladimir Putin: responsible, competent, reliable, but at the same time – empathic, very 
emotional, and compassionate. 
  
We are to remember that the program is anyways a show – even if it has an extremely 
official, governmental image – it has its producers and script writers – and – a plot. And 
as any other shows, it has its targeted audience and particular objectives and goals, which 
are achieved in higher or lower degree: people, living in the country and abroad, see their 
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President, full of attention towards their problems and ready to do his best to solve all 
their sorrows and expectations. The Direct Line, as well as multiple day-to-day publica-
tions about Vladimir Putin’s benignity and achievements, performs several tasks: first, it 
demonstrates how people trust the President, support him and look for his assistance in 
mending the difficulties of the country; second, the program serves as an evidence of the 
President’s efficiency, the proof of his rightful presidentship; and third, showcasing of 
this efficiency and mutual respect between the President and the people lets launch im-
pressive promotion campaign to his image, significantly investing public approval of the 
President. 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates how the President use the specific traits of the na-
tional mentality for the benefit of his own positive image, which fosters the level of his 
public approval. Even though the Direct Line is a produced show, millions of Russians 
take it at its face value. The show works well, and what is more important, there is an 
obvious demand for such shows. And where there is demand, there inevitably follows 
supply. 
 
Conclusions 
Whenever we try to understand the others’ motives of actions or standstill, we inevitably 
realise that one can't read another man's soul, especially, when referring the strangers’ 
soul. Russian soul has a reputation of enigma for good reason: first vast distance barriers, 
then political barriers of the iron curtain, then finally, cultural and language barriers make 
the nature of the Russian people’ character a tough nut. However, the negative and hostile 
attitude of international community towards the Russian President often gets extrapolated 
to the Russian nation: if these people support their leader, does it mean, that they share 
his political line, his views, and ideas? No, they do not, and in this Thesis, I have ap-
proached this dissonance from the perspective of peculiarities of national mentality.  
In my introduction I formulate the research question: why do Russian people keep on 
trusting and supporting their leader? I answer it by exploring the nature of Russian men-
tality: to be supported, national leader should give the nation what it is longing to, he is 
supposed to satisfy its expectations and hopes. Therefore, the peculiar characteristics of 
Russian national mentalities represent an extensive part of the Thesis. Upon a detailed 
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research on the circumstances of the development of Russians into a nation I have fol-
lowed the main influencing factors, which affected the forging of the Russian national 
mentality. Following the analysis of these factors, geographical position, historical devel-
opment and the Orthodox branch of Christianity are of primary importance, which re-
sulted in more communal mindset and suppression of the individual interests over the 
communal ones; humbleness and lack of individual initiative are of no less importance in 
the construction of the  global picture of a Russian. It is also crucial to remember the 
phenomenal importance of the power hierarchy, where the correlation of rights and obli-
gations diverge: the one holding higher position enjoys his status and full authority, while 
the one at the lowest niche can barely pretend to claim his basic rights. This being said, 
one should also remember specific relations between the head of the state and his subjects: 
these bear more characteristics of relations of father and children, where father protects 
and takes care.  
The performed analysis brings me to the following conclusion: these traits of national 
mentality are the key determinants to how the public approval is constructed for the one 
who holds the post of the head of the country. The detailed analysis of the development 
of Russian nation, the constructivist efforts of the two monarchs two the building of na-
tional consciousness, combined with the primordial pre-disposition, and the key charac-
teristics of the result of these process – the Russian national mentality – provides us with 
an image of people, who feel proud of their past, as they are constantly reminded of the 
past achievements. These people need a strong, powerful leader, who would assume re-
sponsibility for their future and who would tackle all the challenges, imposed by the 
stranger world. For these people the imperfection of the governmental system only means 
that the President (or, the Tsar) has not learnt about it yet, and he has all the authority to 
improve it. For them, their President does not belong to the Government, instead, he rules 
the Government, too. And even if the system does not work, they hardly will do anything 
to change it, because taking the initiative is not among the priorities within the system of 
values in the matrix of Russian national mentality. 
Vladimir Putin is exactly this kind of ruler, or, he has been doing his best for the fulfilment 
of these aspirations. Was it a coincidence or not, at the moment of his accession to power 
he demonstrated himself being that very person, whom Russians had been waiting for far 
too long: decisive, authoritative, caring. The Direct Line with Vladimir Putin is the most 
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spectacular evidence of how the President takes advantage of his knowledge of the Rus-
sians’ mentality. In the analysis that I have conducted in the third chapter of the Thesis 
one can see how people appeal to their batiushka with their most crucial issues, looking 
for understanding. Putin accepts the people’s love, and, by demonstrating his deep and 
sincere involvement, promises in return to settle these issues. He knowingly readdresses 
the expressions of public discontent and confirms the rightfulness of his holding the post 
of the President. 
Not only the program is designed to arrange communication between the ruler and the 
people: it also works as a powerful promotional event, where the image of the President 
gains deeper public approval. What is important to get insight into, is that this kind of 
promotion applies brilliantly for a nation, for whom the President is far more than the 
highest administrative official of the country – he rather represents a symbol of prosper-
ous future of this nation. Being a national leader irrevocably requires the comprehension 
of the nation, its history, culture, and system of values. A key to obtaining the influence 
and power over a nation lies in intimate knowledge of the nation’s specifics. This ability 
to invoke the underlying peculiarities of the national mentality has all the chances to be-
come a determinant in the creation of the public approval and loyalty for the one, who 
aims to take the helm of the country and retain one’s power for long. The case study of 
the Direct Line with Vladimir Putin demonstrates how important it is to constantly sup-
port such level of public approval by communicating with the nation through the opera-
tion of principal characteristics of national mentality. 
The case of Russian national mentality has demonstrated how the knowledge of historical 
and cultural past of a nation facilitate the understanding of one; it is crucial to remember 
that every nation has its own concept of values, beliefs, and perceives the issues of power 
and state in its own way, which fails to be applied to another nation. And, going back to 
the quotation of Joseph de Maistre, I would conclude that there is a grain of truth in the 
statement about every nation having the Government it deserves. Or, rather, some nations 
have that very Government, because it needs it, and cannot exist with another one. 
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